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Burke's Sublime and Terror of Leviathan
from an Irish Catholic Perspective
Toshio Tsunoda
It is tempting to see some reflections of the Catholic and Protestant
confessional divide in every field in eighteenth-century Irish culture and
society. This essay does not resist this temptation. I will try to find some
theoretical foundation for Burke's politics of Catholics' rights in his early
aesthetic work, Sublime and Beautiful. My basic argument will be that his
emphasis on the sublime as originated from the passions of terror and self-
preservation has a clear relevance to the Irish Catholic demand to separate
their political needs from the religious considerations. The ultimate
political purpose of preserving life and body through peace seems to have
underlain the sublime psychology. Furthermore, the rule of terror by
sheer absolute power will be avoided by securing allegiance to govern-
ment by its sublimity. While Burke's sublime is often related to religion, I
will emphasize its secular politicalimplication. But I will begin by putting
his aesthetics in the context of early eighteenth-century British and Irish
controversy between George Berkeley, an Anglican bishop, and deists and
moral-sense moralists to make it clear that Burke's aesthetics on the
sublime had some religious and politicalimplications.
Both deists and moralists can be said to have kept God at a distance
by propounding moral principles independent of revealed religion. Relig-
ion was reduced to rational morality when Toland subjected revelation to
rational examination, denying the former any authority to demand consent
on its own; for him truth in religion and morality presupposes clear ideas
whose agreement or disagreement reason judges. God was eclipsed by
nature when Tindal replaced revelation by natural religion; rational
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evidence of nature is superior to revelation as a universal means of
communication. Moral philosophers promoted their independence from
Christian religion by basing morality on social sentiments which were in
parallel to the sentiments of beauty. For Shaftesbury human subjects are
moral agents with the moral sense to perceive delightful virtues and with
natural affections for the public good beyond self-interestand partiality.
Hutcheson developed Shaftesbury's concept of the moral sense through
empirical observations of human nature, in which he found the orientation
to beauty and virtue. The natural structure of senses and passions enables
humans to perceive beauty in uniformity, harmony and order and approve
benevolent sentiments and characters of rational agents. In short, the di-
vine will was done without and the moral source was sought in the real
natural order of providence, which could be understood by reason, and
then the source was internalized in the subjective senses and sentiments.
It can be said that rational deists and moral-sense moralists conspired
to internalize the moral standard into the individual reason and sense
respectively. As the private subjectives assumed the moral standard, the
morality of civil society was formed outside the public authority of church
and state, so that religion and politics were no longer morally essential.
This might be how the deist and moralist challenge looked to the
Anglican establishment. Particular revealed religion was their defence
against both subjectivization and universalization of moral and religious
truth. Anarchy was naturally associated with the subjective tendency, but
the deist attempt at the universal true religion was no less fearful in that it
tended to minimize the difference of sects and reduce the privileges of the
Anglican Church in Ireland. The deist controversy had sensitive political
implications for the privileged Anglican minority with weak social back-
ing; so the Irish House of Commons prosecuted Toland's Christianity Not
Mysterious (Berman 137).
Against this political background Bishop Berkeley developed his
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religious philosophical works, vindicating revelation against free thinkers,
that is, the deists and moralists mentioned above. The three points seem
noticeable in considering him in relation to Burke's critique of deism.
First,in Berkeley's view a preceding visual idea is a sign of a tactileidea,
which is more vital because of its direct relation to the human's
preserving their bodies. He connects his theory of sight to his theology by
calling this sign 'an universal language of the author of nature, whereby
we are instructed how to regulate our actions in order to attain those
things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies,
as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them' (1231).
His demonstration of God's active existence and providence seems
persuasive and secular as it is thus based on very basic human needs of
body in common life, while the deists and moralists have to assume the
higher faculties like reason and the moral sense.
The second noticeable point is emphasis Berkeley put on rhetoric in
his defence of revelation against rationalism. While for the deists the only
use of words is to signify and communicate clear ideas, he observes a
practical use of words without any ideas, by which to inspire passions,
implant dispositions and encourage actions. This is indeed a rhetorical use
of words; the eloquent inspire 'the passions of fear, love, hatred, admira-
tion, disdain,...without any ideas coming between' (1137). He distinguishes
'a practical faith' from deists' true knowledge based on 'absolute certainty
and demonstration' and justifies the former even without 'abstract,precise,
distinctideas' as far as it has a positive effect on passions and actions
(1113,88,99,286). Moreover, the rhetorical view of language leads him to
the appreciation of common sense and 'prejudice'; 'admitting diverse
things as true, which in a rigorous sense are not such, but only received
by the vulgar and admitted for such' (1263). His extended understanding
of reality may tend to be uncritical. Common sense supporting power is
opposed to autonomous reason, criticalof power.
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Thirdly, Berkeley finds in the moral sense theory subjective enthusi-
asm disrupting the objective moral order. It seems that the moralists'
subjectivism belies moral realism. He thinks that people are too selfish to
be usually motivated by the higher moral beauty and that they tend to
mistake their subjective passions for judgement of the public good,
deceived by partiality. So, Berkeley suggests, instead of each judging
what will make for the public good by the moral sense in each particular
case, we should reason natural laws as a spectator detached from immedi-
ate interests and then observe the general rules even if this causes some
damages in particular cases (VI23,33).
Burke, whose first literary work, A Vindication of Natural Society,
was a satire on Bolingbroke's deism and Rousseau's equality, must have
known the Irish deist controversy. I will put Sublime and Beautiful in this
context, relating his theory of sublimity to his conviction that religion and
politics are morally essential and his criticism of moral autonomy of
individual reason and the moral sense in modern philosophy. The two
thinkers thus shared their criticism of the deists. But this does not neces-
sarily mean that Berkeley and Burke had only similar ideas. I would
rather try to find different aspects of their ideas because Burke, a Whig
politician with Catholic background, was surely different from Berkeley,
an Anglican bishop. To put the contrast in a few words, while Berkeley
seems to have been mainly interested in defending Christian religion,
Burke's concern was virtually secular in securing Irish Catholics' common
life from persecuting power. The theory of sublimity perhaps needs to be
read as an insightful analysis of political sentiments in terms of Irish
Catholic experience.
My point is that Burke's sublime can be interpreted as a concept by
which to attack modern enthusiasm of reason and the moral sense. Deism
and Protestantism were embodiments of modern enthusiasm. I might say
that he established the aesthetic category of sublime in order to call back
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awe to God, who was receding with nature applauded. When he
emphasizes power as an origin of the sublime, stating that 'I know of
nothing sublime which is not some modification of power' (S&B64), he
conceives an example of God, and denies the deists' claim to contemplate
the idea of God without terror or awe. The sublime causes the strongest
passions because it is ultimately traced to self-preservation; the sublime
passions are caused by pain and fear threatening life and body. So the
sublime is related to very basic needs of human existence. Here, appealing
to the sublime of the divine power, Burke, like Berkeley, defends revealed
religion in quite a secular non-rational way. The Irish tradition of theology
had sensationalism, observing that the deist rational conceptualization of
God offered only incomplete representation (Bermanl35). Burke is
following this sensationalism when he explains that 'when we contemplate
the Deity, his attributes and their operation coming united on the mind,
form a sort of sensible image' (S&B68). Thus the deity can be an object
of imagination as well as reason, and Burke justifies aesthetic approach to
the deity.
Though intending to defend traditional revealed religion, Burke's
aesthetic appreciation of sense and passions was subverting the traditional
hierarchy of reason above passions and senses. I observed that the concept
of sublime was intended to revive awe to the divine power, but, if the
sublime is based on the principle of self-preservation, the sublime seems
an inappropriate way to justify the divine power which should go beyond
life and body in this world to the everlasting life of the spirit.In fact,
what worried Hobbes most was Christian salvation absolving subjects
from obedience to the sovereignty by reducing their fear of death. So
Burke's concept of sublime based on self-preservation should be made
better use of when it justifies the political power rather than the divine
power. We should remark that the sublime powers include political power
and read his theory of sublime passions as a psychological explanation of
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obedience to authority. This reading coincides with the contemporary Irish
Catholic concern to demonstrate their obedience to the Protestant state for
reconciliation.
It is true that an aim of Burke's aesthetics was Addisonian moral
improvement through politeness of refined taste and manners; this
Enlightenment strategy would create free autonomous civil society outwith
state power. But he and the Irish Catholics were stilltoo much preoccu-
pied with the confessional state affairs to let the state pass out of the ob-
jects of his aesthetics.In the context of the Protestant-state-ridden Catholic
community where Burke grew up, he would never dismiss the critical
questions of state power: what egregious evils it was capable of and how
it should be obeyed. The state was an uppermost object of sublime pas-
sions such as terror and respect. As his preference for the sublime derived
from self-preservation to sociable beauty shows, Burke was more con-
cerned with security of life and body than with refined taste, so the state
power is explained and justified as sublime not only because its forces as
ultima ratio are effective, appealing to the terror of death, but because its
purpose is the people's self-preservation. The violence of the sublime
passions can be moderated from terror to admiration and respect as the
destructive power is restrained. So this change of the degree of sublime
passions would make it possible to secure obedience not by enforcement
but by consent. But Burke never loses sight of the essence of power: the
sublime of power is never caused by 'social utility',but by its destructive-
ness (S&B65). This conviction is salutary if it warns him of the danger of
power; while complacent utilitarianscan abuse power.
The sublime of power was opposed to enthusiasm of another kind of
the sublime attached to reason and virtue. Burke was among the
establishment ideologues replying to criticalrationalism which tended to
culminate in subjective enthusiasm transcending common life and social
order. For example, Shaftesbury shows how the sublime causes
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enthusiasm: 'itinspires us with something more than ordinary, and raises
us above our-selves' (11130,31). This radical sublime may have conspired
with the sublime power in English Protestantism which destroyed the Irish
Catholic traditional community. Here deists, moralists and Protestants
were all enthusiasts. In modern philosophy the sublime was associated
with enthusiasm, that is, proud self-assertion of subjects in the Humean
version. Burke reconceptualized the sublime, emphasizing the passive
existence of humans who suffer from pain and fear; his concept of
sublime is orientated to superstition rather than enthusiasm.
Deist rationalism which reduced sublime terror and obedience to
church and state was also challenged by recourse to rhetorical tradition.
Burke's ideas on rhetorical use of language has an important political
relevance, showing how language works in politics(Hampsher-Monk455).
He points out that in poetry and eloquence 'their business is to affect
rather by sympathy than imitation; to display rather the effect of things on
the mind of the speaker, or of others, than to present a clear idea of the
things themselves' (S&B172). This passionate theory of rhetoric was
opposed to the deists' rational view of language and clear ideas. He
distinguishes 'a clear expression' and 'a strong expression', remarking that
'the former regards the understanding; the latter belongs to the passions'
(S&B175). This will prove that reason alone is no sufficient to lead the
people into action. Obscurity is a source of the sublime while knowledge
and information reduce the sublime. Though he was criticalof the blind
obedience to despotism, his main purpose was to secure conformity to the
revolution settlement, whose sublime authority could be eradicated by
criticalrationalism.
Like Berkeley, Burke did not accept the moral sense theory. He
stresses the improvement of judgement in taste, referring to the moral
sense as 'as if the taste were a separate faculty of the mind, and distinct
from the judgment and imagination; a species of instinct by which we are
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struck naturally, and at the first glance, without any previous reasoning
with the excellencies, or the defects of a composition' (S&B26). The
moral sense theory is problematical in that it applies the idea of beauty
indiscriminately to virtue and confuses morality. Burke remarks that 'this
loose and inaccurate manner of speaking, has therefore misled us both in
the theory of taste and of morals; and induced us to remove the science of
our duties from their proper basis (our reason, our relations, and our
necessities), to rest it upon foundations altogether visionary and
unsubstantial' (S&B112). So Burke's ethics is rational, distinct from
aesthetic sensationalism, yet he does not refrain from applying aesthetic
principles to ethics; he regards great virtues such as fortitude, justice and
wisdom as sublime causing terror (S&B110). It would be thus possible to
develop this explanation of justice in terms of sublime passions.
I might find what Burke's rational version of ethics would be like in
his early draft on religion. Here he finds duty formed in mutual office to
necessities in equal relations among rational beings; reason, love and
sympathy urges us to return office (F're-Revolutionary Writings82-87). He
may have learned this relational explanation of duty from Pufendorf's
natural jurisprudence of sociability as his On the Duty of Man and Citizen
according to Natural Law was among Burke's university texts. But they
differ noticeably in their treatment of religion and ethics. Pufendorf sought
universal natural law, excluding particular revealed religion as its basis;
and he distinguished natural religion for the sanction for promoting
sociability while moral theology was based on revelation for saving souls
(8,9). But Burke tried to base morals and law on revealed religion; he was
critical of making religion a mere civil sanction, and for him religion
included morals, not morals religion. He was critical of the modern
natural jurisprudence as secular moral science independent of revealed
religion, convinced that revealed religion was essential to morality. But
his theory of the sublime passions introduced a new empirical way of
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looking at both God and justice in terms of senses and passions.
I have argued that Burke's sublime was intended to overcome radical
enthusiasm of rationalism. Furthermore I might suggest that the Irish
Catholic experience of persecution by the Protestants underlay his
apprehension of destructive power of rational enthusiasm. I will conclude
this essay by illustrating how his specific political discourses on the Irish
Catholic question were provided with theoretical foundation by his theory
of the sublime passions, and thereby showing some Catholic implications
of Burke's philosophy.
Some deists and moralists were anti-Catholic in their campaign
against Jacobitism and the French universal monarchy in the early eight-
eenth century. For example, Hutcheson, advocating freedom of conscience,
denounced 'the superstitious political tenets, defined for the aggrandising
of the ecclesiasticks, and the enslaving of the souls and bodies of the rest
of mankind' (V219). Though he himself was sympathetic to the Irish
Catholics in plight and the direct target of this anti-clericalism was
Jacobites, it could be used to keep prejudice against Catholics. It is
generally said that Irish Presbyterians accepting the Scottish
Enlightenment were liberal but sectarian especially against Catholics
(McFarland25). Around 1760, when such anti-Catholicism of the Whig
political culture was mitigated and the Catholic emancipation became a
political agenda, appeared Burke in public life. He committed himself to
the Catholic cause so much that a recent biography even regards him as
Catholic rather than Anglo-Irish (O'Brien22). He encouraged John Curry
to publish his impartial Irish history, and denounced the authorities for
mistaking the Whiteboy disturbance for the French and Catholic rebellion
and executing some Catholic gentlemen {Correspondence 1201,249).
In Tracts on the Popery Laws Burke denounces the penal laws as the
instrument of despotism to invade subjects' life and property and
discourage industry with the result that Ireland got underdeveloped in
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poverty. In his opinion the laws were 'a more sensible departure from the
spirit of the common law'; the Irish parliament enacted them against the
Limerick treaty and the English crown and government should have
prevented the legislation (Writings and SpeechesIX437,471-473). Here I
cannot judge the extent to which this estimation of the laws' effects is an
exaggeration. My present interest is not historical,but theoretical:Burke's
logic and, if hard to demonstrate, psychology. The people's terror in
having their own lives threatened by great power of the modern state
might have formed a part of the Irish national memory, and this
experience of terror might have something to do with the fact that Burke
derived the principle of the sublime from the terror about self-preservation.
More importantly, his theory of the sublime passions seems to
provide some sensational basis for his natural law, on which he criticizes
the penal laws. As he criticizesthe moral sense's subjectivity in favour of
reason, relation and necessities on which duty is based, so he
delegitimates the penal laws as against natural law and factious in
damaging the majority's interests. His vindication of convention, as in A
Vindication of Natural Society, does not rule out the repeal of the existing
laws; the repeal was not due to the imperfection inevitable to any human
institutions,but to the essential defects incompatible with the nature and
purpose of law. While Burke requires the just laws to have 'the consent of
the people', this consent does not mean democratic participation but rather
passive support due to sharing the common interests, and the popular
consent is not the basis of the legitimacy of the laws; even the people's
consent cannot legitimatize laws damaging to them all.The source of laws
derives from 'a superior law', that is, 'the will of Him who gave us our
nature, and in giving, impressed an invariable law upon it' (454,455).
While the popular consent and opinion, like the moral sense, form the
partial world of subjectivity, the principle of legislation should be 'equity'
and 'general and public utility';legislators should consider the common
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rational human nature, detached from parochial particular interests;
otherwise 'an artificial difference between men' would be imposed by the
partial utility as in the penal laws (456). Burke's aesthetics on the sublime
passions provides the very perspective in which to perceive the divine
natural law in the distance beyond the near partiality. Burke's Irish
politics was thus structured not only by his attachment to the Catholic
traditional community but by his spectatorial detachment from factious
interests.
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